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INTRODUCTION

A series of coal mining disasters in the early 1960's led Congress
to "protect the safety and health of our nation's miners"' by enacting the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 ("1969
Act"). 2 Then, with less than a decade of experience under the 1969
Act, Congress enacted even more comprehensive mine safety legislation, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Act"
or "1977 Act"). 3 The 1977 Act, for the first time, brought the full
panoply of federal powers to bear in the battle to protect miners
in all the nation's mines. 4
Instead of setting goals and giving a federal agency broad powers
to carry out its legislative intent, Congress regulated mine safety and
health in the 1969 Act by legislating comprehensive "interim mandatory safety and health standards;" 5 Congress left these interim
standards unchanged in the 1977 Act. Congress recognized, as the
term "interim" suggests, that the legislated interim standards should
not remain static; rather, safety of the miners required that such
standards evolve "to provide increased safety and, when necessary,
6
to meet changes in technology and mining conditions and systems."
1. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., IstSess. 5 (1977), reprintedin Loxs~t.Av HISTORY OF Tim
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 at 593 (1978) [hereinafter 1977 AcT LEOISLATrm
HISTORY]; see 30 U.S.C. 801 (1982).
2. 30 U.S.C. § 801-960 (1976).
3. 30 U.S.C. § 801-960 (1982).
4. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
5. See 30 U.S.C. § 841-77 (1982); see generally, D. VIsH, P. McGn~IIY, & T. BIDLE, 1 COAL
LAW & RsuuArTON § 5.02[2] (1983).
6. H.R. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969), reprinted in LEOISLATVE HISTORY,
FEmAL COAL Mnm HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT at 1040 (1970) [hereinafter 1969 ACT LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
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The 1977 Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor7 ("Secretary")

to employ two procedures for changing the statutory interim mandatory safety standards. The first procedure is a rulemaking process
by which the Secretary can promulgate new, "improved"

8 industry-

wide safety and health standards, 9 subject to the limitation that any
new or revised standard not "reduce the protection" 10 afforded by
an existing standard.1 The second procedure allows individual mining companies or miner representatives to "petition for modification" of a particular interim safety standard if local conditions
warrant. This novel procedure reflected congressional appreciation
that the diversity and dynamic nature of mining, as well as the
anticipated evolution of mining technology, meant that rote appli-

cation of existing mandatory safety standards 12 might not best ensure
miner safety under all conditions. 13 This petition procedure authorizes the Secretary to modify application of a mandatory safety
standard 14 on a mine-specific basis under either of two circum7. Under the 1969 Act, the Secretary of the Interior was responsible for enforcement. See 30
U.S.C. § 802(a) (1976). In 1977, Congress changed the implementing agency to the Department of
Labor. References to the "Secretary" throughout the 1977 Act are to the Secretary of Labor. 30
U.S.C. § 802(a) (1982). See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. The Secretary of Labor's
delegate for carrying out his responsibilities under the 1977 Act is the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA").
8. 30 U.S.C. § 861(a) (1982).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 861 (1982).
10. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(9) (1982).
11. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a), (a)(9) (1982).
12. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
13. H.R. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 78 (1969), reprinted in 1969 ACT LEGIsLATvE
HISTORY at 1040 (1970). See also Reliable Coal Corp. v. Morton, 478 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1973)
(citing 1969 AcT LEoIsLATrvE HIsToaY and construing § 301(c) of the 1969 Act which is identical to
§ 101(c) of the 1977 Act).
14. Mandatory health standards cannot be modified through the petition for modification process. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986); see
Kanawha Coal Co., 5 I.B.M.A. 299, 302 (1975). The Senate version of the 1977 Act would have
allowed modification of both mandatory health and safety standards. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 25-26 (1977) reprinted in 1977 AcT LEaIsIATrvE HISTORY at 613-14 (1978). This provision
was deleted in conference and was replaced by the language of § 301(c) of the 1969 Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 861(c) (1976), which applied only to mandatory safety standards. S. REP. No. 461, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 42-43 (1977) reprintedin 1977 ACT LEGISLATrVE HISTORY at 1320-21 (1978). But see 30 U.S.C.§
951(f) (1982) (rarely used provision allowing the Secretary to grant an exception to a mandatory health
or safety standard to allow educational institutions to experiment with new mining techniques and
equipment).
A petition for modification proceeding cannot be used to
challenge the applicability of a mandatory safety standard at a particular mine or the validity
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stances: 1) where there is an alternative to a safety standard that
does not reduce the level of safety afforded by the standard in the
mine, or 2) where the standard, as applied in the mine, diminishes

safety. 15
The petition for modification process, which began as a wellintentioned and necessary vehicle for ensuring miner safety, has not
achieved its purpose. A combination of seriously deficient imple-

menting regulations, 16 agency delays, and a cumbersome litigation
process has so hampered the petition process that it may no longer
be a viable form of relief. However, for all the reasons that Congress

recognized, the need for a safety standard modification is often critical if safe mining operations are to be maintained within the bounds

of the law. Procedural reform to overcome the present impediments
to modification is vitally necessary, and movement in that direction
has already begun. This article will survey the petition process, examine its problems, and evaluate present efforts at reform.

of MSHA's interpretation of a particular mandatory standard. Oneida Mining Co., 6 I.B.M.A. 343,
348-49 (1976); Itman Coal Co., 6 I.B.M.A. 121, 126-129 (1976); See also Kaiser Coal Corp., 10
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1165 (1988) (separate declaratory relief action was brought before the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission to challenge the applicability of a regulation while a petition
to modify that regulation was pending before a Department of Labor administrative law judge). In
a petition proceeding, the applicability and validity of a mandatory safety standard must be presumed;
challenges to the applicability or validity of a mandatory safety standard must be made in the context
of an enforcement proceeding under § 105(d) of the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1982). See Oneida, 6
I.B.M.A. at 349-50; Itmann, 6 I.B.M.A. at 129.
Mine operators can seek to modify the terms of various mine plans (e.g., roof control plans,
30 C.F.R. § 75.220 (1988), and ventilation and methane and dust control plans, 30 C.F.R. § 75.316
(1988)) through the petition for modification process. See Affinity Mining Co., 6 I.B.M.A. 100 (1976)
(on reconsideration)(because mine plan is enforceable as a mandatory standard, operator can file a
petition for modification to change it); cf. Old Ben Coal Co., 6 I.B.M.A. 163, 165-166 (1976) (regulations establishing criteria for plan approvals are not mandatory standards and, therefore, cannot
be modified in a petition for modification proceeding). As a practical matter, the mine specific nature
of these plans coupled with the opportunity to revise them following comments from MSHA suggests
that petitions to modify plans are unnecessary. Indeed, the recently promulgated roof control regulations make very clear the Secretary's view that the plan approval process is the one that operators
must use to seek plan revisions. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.220, 75.223 (1988); MSHA Program Policy
Letter No. 88-V-1 (Aug. 19, 1988). However, if MSHA refuses to accept a plan revision, filing a
petition for modification may result in adjudication of the plan dispute issue without the enforcement
action generally necessary to litigate such disputes. See infra note 144.
15. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986); see S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 ACT LEGisLATrvE HISTORY at 613 (1978).
16. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 44 (1988).
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II.

THE PETITION PRocEss: AN OVERVmW

An understanding of the current petition process is necessary to
appreciate its problems. Thus, we first review the mechanics for
modifying a mandatory safety standard.
.A.

The Petition

A petition for modification may be filed with the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health ("Assistant Secretary") by a mine
7
operator or by the representative of the miners at a particular mine.
If the petition is filed by the mine operator, it must be served personally or by certified mail on the representative of the miners; a
petition filed by the miners' representative must be served in a like
8
manner on the operator.'
Section 101(c) of the Act provides that a petition for modification
may be granted if
the Secretary determines [1] that an alternative method of achieving the result of
such standard exists which will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded the miners of such mine by such standard, or [2] that
the application of such standard
to such mine will result in a diminution of safety
9
to the miners in such mine.'

In addition to the requirement that one or both of the statutory prerequisites be alleged in a petition, the Secretary's regulations state that a petition must contain 1) the petitioner's name and
address; 2) the mine identification number and location of the mine
or mines affected; 3) the mandatory safety standard sought to be
modified; 4) "[a] concise statement of the modification requested"20
including whether the petitioner intends to show the safety of the

17. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986); 30 C.F.R. § 44.10 (1988). Until very recently, only mine operators

filed petitions for modification either when they (like Ford) "had a better idea" for achieving the
result of the mandatory standard without decreasing its level of safety, or when application of the
mandatory safety standard actually would diminish the safety of the miners. Last year, however, the
United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") filed several petitions for modification in an attempt
to require mine operators to implement safety measures in addition to those otherwise required by
a particular mandatory safety standard. See infra notes 137-92 and accompanying text.
18. 30 C.F.R. § 44.10 (1988).
19. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
20. 30 C.F.R. § 44.11(a)(l)-(4) (1988).
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alternative method, diminution of safety, or both; 5) a statement
of facts to support the grounds alleged to warrant the modification;
and 6) identification of the representative of the miners if the petitioner is a mine operator. 21 A petition may be filed for more than
one mine where identical issues of law or fact are involved, but it
cannot be filed for more than one operator or seek modification of
more than one mandatory safety standard.2
After a petition is filed, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) must publish a notice and summary of it in the
Federal Register and allow thirty days for "interested parties" to
comment on the petition in writing. 23 The statute provides that any
"interested party '2 may participate in a petition proceeding by filing a request for hearing.2 5 However, a "person claiming a right of
participation as an interested party ' 26 must first apply for party
status to the Assistant Secretary. If, after a hearing has been requested, 27 others claim to be "interested parties," they must apply
for party status to the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the De28
partment of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges.
B.

The MSHA ConsiderationProcess

MSHA is responsible for "investigating" the petition pursuant
to section 101(c), which requires that the Secretary "shall cause such
29
investigation to be made [of the petition] as he deems appropriate."
Under the statute, that investigation must include an opportunity
for a hearing.30 The Secretary's implementing regulations have translated this "investigation" phase into a two-stage process.
21. 30 C.F.R. § 44.11(a)(5),(6) (1988).
22. 30 C.F.R. § 44.11(b) (1988).
23. 30 C.F.R. § 44.12 (1988); see also 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
If a petition for modification is amended, the petition as amended must be republished in the
FederalRegister. Gateway Coal Co,, 2 I.B.M.A. 107, 112 (1973).

24. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
25. When a party requesting a hearing has actual notice of a proceeding and does not participate, that party will be deemed to have waived its participation ights. Gateway, 2 I.B.M.A. at 11214.
26. 30 C.F.R. § 44.3 (1988).
27. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hearing process.
28. 30 C.F.R. § 44.3 (1988).
29. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1988).
30. Id.
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The initial stage of the process takes place before the appropriate
MSHA Administrator (either for Coal Mine Safety and Health or
for Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health) ("Administrator"), who must make the first-line decision as to whether the petition should be granted. 3' But, as the Secretary no doubt recognized
in promulgating regulations, the Administrator cannot make that
decision based solely upon allegations in the petition. 32 "Upon receipt of a petition for modification," MSHA begins an investigation,
generally including a field investigation, of those allegations. 33 Although the regulations do not specifically require it3 following its
investigation, MSHA prepares an investigative report which contains
the investigators' findings as well as a draft proposed decision and
order reflecting the investigators' recommendation to the Administrator to either grant or deny the petition. Typically, the investigative report is served on the mine operator, the miners'
representative, and others within MSHA, each of whom has thirty
days to submit written comments.
Following the close of the comment period, the Administrator
issues a proposed decision and order "based upon all available information, including the results of the investigation." 35 That decision
becomes final for the Secretary after thirty days unless a hearing is
36
requested.
If no request for hearing is filed, a petition which has been granted
by the Administrator becomes final, 37 thus becoming a new man-

31. 30 C.F.R. § 44.13 (1988). The Administrator issues a written decision on a petition in the
form of a proposed decision and order. Id.
32. See 30 C.F.R. § 44.13 (1988).

33. Id.
34. Cf. 30 C.F.R. § 44.13 (1988) (The proposed decision and order shall be based on "the

results of the investigation," inter alia).
35. 30 C.F.R. § 44.13.

36. Id. If the request for hearing is not timely filed, the Administrator's proposed decision and
order will take effect. Beth Elkhorn Coal Corp., No. 80-MS-4 (July 20, 1980) (ALJ Ramsey).

In a case where a proposed decision and order grants the petition, filing a request for hearing
prevents the granted petition from becoming effective. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.13, 44.50(a) (1988). However,
if request for hearing is filed, a successful petitioner can file for relief pending appeal to give effect
to the Administrator's proposed decision and order while the "appeal" is being decided. 30 C.F.R.

§ 44.50(b) (1988). See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
37. 30 C.F.R. § 44.4(b) (1988).
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datory standard for the mine.3 8 As is the case with all other man39
datory standards, failure to comply with terms and conditions of
a granted petition will subject an operator to MSHA enforcement
action4

C.

The Hearing and Appeal Stage
A party's request for hearing triggers the second stage of the

petition process. Jurisdiction over the petition moves from the Administrator to the Department of Labor Office of Administrative
Law Judges. 41 A request for hearing must be filed with the appropriate Administrator within thirty days after service of the proposed
decision and order. 42 When a request for hearing is filed, the petition
and the administrative record are referred to the Chief Judge of the
Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges, who

assigns the petition to an administrative law judge ("ALJ") for hearing. 43 Hearings are conducted in accordance with Part 44 of Title
38. See Int'l Union, UMWA v. MSHA (Kaiser Coal Corp.),
4823 F.2d 608, 615 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (D.C. Circuit jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) to
hear appeals concerning the promulgation of a mandatory safety includes modifications of a mandatory
safety standard) [hereinafter Int'l Union/(Kaiser)].
39. The "terms and conditions" of a petition consist of the petitioner's alterhative method or
proposed "substitute" measures, see infra note 106, plus whatever additional conditions may be required to ensure that the granted petition is no less safe than the standard.
40. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a), 814(d), 820(a), 820(c), 820(d) (1986).
One question that may arise is whether a granted petition can be modified to addrest changing
mining conditions. The regulations answer only part of that question. If changed circumstances render
the findings which justified granting the petition ifivalid, any party to the petition proceedings may
file for revocation of the petition. 30 C.F.R. § 44.52 (1988). See, e.g., Order of Dismissal, Empire
Energy Corp., No. 85-MSA-8 (Nov. 14, 1985) (ALI Thomas) (revocation granted based on material
change in circumstances). However, that section does not provide for the modification of a petition;
thus, it fails to address a situation where the need for the petition is just as real as when it was
granted, but mining conditions or advances in technology mean that one or two of the conditions
imposed in the granted petition should be changed. Arguably, a petitioner could file to revoke an
offending condition in a granted petition, although § 44.52 does not specifically provide for the pdrtlal
revocation of a petition. In addition, since the petition for modification becomes a new mandatory
standard for that mine and since mandatory standards may only be changed through the petition
process, 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986), it seems that the granted petition could be modified by filing tt
new petition.
41. 30 C.F.R. § 44.15 (1988).
42. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.13, 44.14 (1988).
43. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.15, 44.20 (1988).
Preliminary issues such as motions for summary decision or jurisdictional issues may be referred
to an ALJ for resolution of that limited dispute before the petition case in chief is even assigned.
See, e.g., Decision and Order, Kaiser Coal Corp., No. 86-MSA-1 (Dec. 6, 1985) (ALJ Levin) (jurisdictional issue decided before a request for hearing was filed).
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30 of the Code of Federal Regulations," and, in the absence of an
applicable regulation under Part 44,45 in accordance with the rules

of practice and procedure for administrative hearings before the Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges. 46 After a

hearing has been held, 47 the ALJ must issue a written initial decision
and order granting or denying the petition. 48 That decision will be-

44. 30 C.F.R. pt. 44 (1988). Subpart C of 30 C.F.R. pt. 44 governs petition for modification
hearings. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.20, 44.32 (1988).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 18.1(a) (1988).
46. 29 C.F.R. pt. 18 (1988).
47. The presiding ALJ may require the parties to file and serve findings of fact and conclusions
of law, together with a supporting briefs. 30 C.F.R. § 44.31 (1988).
48. 30 C.F.R. § 44.32(a) (1988).
Although petition proceedings involve a hearing, the question has been raised as to whether
they are adjudications or rulemakings. In one petition case, the ALJ disagreed with MSHA's contention that petition proceedings are in the nature of mine-specific rulemakings. Kaiser Coal, No. 86MSA-l, slip op. at 9-12 (July 7, 1988) (ALJ Rosenzweig, appeal pending before Assistant Secretary
(filed Aug. 5, 1988)). The ALJ reached that conclusion because the petition subsection, § 101(c),
refers to § 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982) ("APA"), entitled
"Adjudications," but the general rulemaking provisions of the Act, beginning at § 101(a), refer to
§ 553 of the APA entitled "Rule making." In addition, the AUJ placed considerable emphasis on
cases holding that adjudications are appropriate for individual cases, while rulemakings are appropriate
for broad policy issues.
Labeling the petition process as an "adjudication" or a "rulemaking" appears to make little
practical difference. As Professor Davis points out, the more important issue is selecting the proper
procedure to fit the task:
Whether a proceeding is rulemaking or adjudication, a dispute about specific facts pertaining
to a particular party calls for trial procedure. Whether a proceeding is rulemaking or adjudication, an issue about broad and general facts may usually best be determined by written
submissions, but a particular judgment should be made on the question whether an identified
question of specific fact not pertaining to a particular party may best be resolved by trial
procedure. Whether a proceeding is rulemaking or adjudication, the appropriate procedure
for interpreting law or policy involves written submissions or oral arguments or both, and
the same is true of creating new law or policy in the absence of factual issues.
2 K. DAviS, AD ums5ATnrE LAw TREATISE § 10.5 at 324-25 (2d ed. 1979).
Although the hearing stage before the ALJ is conducted as an adjudicatory proceeding, the
outcome of the petition process is ultimately the same as a rulemaking, regardless of the type of
procedures used, because it establishes a new mandatory standard for a mine.
Moreover, calling a petition proceeding an adjudication or a rulemaking seems to make no
practical difference as to review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1982). Section 101(d), 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1986), requires that any
challenge to a mandatory standard-whether an industry-wide or mine specific standard-be brought
in the appropriate court of appeals 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1986). And, regardless of whether the standard
of review is whether the agency action was "arbitrary and capricious" (rulemaking) or supported by
"substantial evidence" (adjudication), the D.C. Circuit has held that there is little practical difference
between the two standards. Int'l Union, UMWA v. MSHA (Emerald Mine Corp.), 830 F.2d 289,
293 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Intl Union/(Emerald)]. See infra note 57.
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come final within thirty days unless an appeal is taken to the As49
sistant Secretary.
If any party remains dissatisfied following issuance of the ALJ's
initial decision and order, it can appeal, thus transferring jurisdiction
over the petition to the Office of the Assistant Secretary 0 As with
the initial "appeal" to the ALJ, the petition, even if granted by the
ALJ, will not become effective during pendency of the appeal to
the Assistant Secretary unless a request for relief pending appeal is
filed and granted.5 ' Once an appeal has been filed, the entire record
of the proceeding is transmitted to the Assistant Secretary. 2 The
parties then file statements in support of their positions. 3 "[B]ased
upon consideration of the entire record of the proceedings transmitted, together with the statements submitted by the parties,15 4 the
Assistant Secretary issues a decision affirming, modifying, or setting
aside all or part of the ALJ's decision. 5 The Assistant Secretary's
decision is final and becomes effective when issued; appeal from
that decision is taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit or the Circuit where the appellant resides or has his principal place of business 5 6 where the standard of
review is whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
57
of discretion.

49. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.32(a), 44.33(a) (1988). If the initial decision grants the petition and a party
appeals, the petitioner can also file for relief pending appeal at this stage of the proceedings. 30
C.F.R. § 44.50 (1988). See supra note 36; see infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
50. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.33 - 44.35 (1988).
51. 30 C.F.R. § 44. See supra notes 36, 49; see infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
52. 30 C.F.R. § 44.34 (1988). The "record" includes: the petition, request for hearing, motions
and rulings, hearing transcript, exhibits, briefs and the ALJ's initial decision and order. Id.
53. 30 C.F.R. § 44.33(b), (c) (1988).
54. 30 C.F.R. § 44.35 (1988).
55. 30 C.F.R. § 44.35 (1988). The Assistant Secretary must explain the reasons for his decision.
Id. The D.C. Circuit has held, "In an area as important as mine safety, the Assistant Secretary must
show that he relied on substantial evidence in granting a petition for modification of a mandatory
safety standard." Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 293.
56. 30 C.F.R. § 44.51 (1988); 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1986).
57. Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 292 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)). However, the
D.C. Circuit stated:
This court has recognized that "the distinction between the arbitrary and capricious standard
and substantial evidence review is largely semantic." Pacific Legal Foundation v. Dep't of
Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
Id. at 293 n.6.
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III.

PROBLEMS IN THE PETITION PROCESS

Procedures for modifying a mandatory safety standard, as described in the regulations, seem straight forward, but major problems have developed with them in practice. Unclear statutory
burdens, cumbersome procedures, and lack of any interim relief from
enforcement of a mandatory standard during pendency of a petition
have transmogrified what should be a relatively simple process into
an unwieldy and largely unsatisfactory method of dispute resolution.
A.

Unclear Statutory Burdens

The regulations provide that a petitioner bears the burden of
proving at a hearing that it has fulfilled either the alternative method
or diminution of safety standard required by the statute. 59 That is
a significant burden because those statutory standards are not defined in the statute and have never been defined by the Assistant
Secretary.60 Even if the petitioner does satisfy those burdens, its
petition may not be granted because the granting of petitions is
within the Secretary's discretion. 61
1. The Alternative Method Standard
Section 101(c) permits the granting of a petition if, inter alia,
"the Secretary determines that an alternative method of achieving
the result of such standard exists which will at all times guarantee
no less than the same measure of protection afforded the miners of

58. To address at least some of the major problems, the Secretary is revising the Part 44
regulations. Proposed rules were released in May, 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,492 (1989).
59. 30 C.F.R. § 44.30(b) (1988); 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
60. See, e.g., Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 293 (remanded to Assistant Secretary to define
the statutory standards).
In deciding a petition for modification case, one ALJ lamented as follows:
The issues here raised are among the most difficult I have ever faced.
My task has been made more difficult by the unavailability of precedent, by a statute
with limited reported legislative history relating to the standard at issue, and by regulations
which, at times, provide more questions than answers.
Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 5.
61. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986); Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 22-24.
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,,62 The statute, providing no

further guidance as to what that language requires, gives rise to a
number of disputes over its meaning. The unions, mining companies,

and MSHA have argued vigorously about the meaning of the phrase
"achieving the result of such standard." 6 The UMWA has suggested
that, in order to achieve the, result of the standard, a proposed
alternative method must provide the same "design" or "physical"
protections that the standard requires. 64 Mining companies (as well
as MSHA) have taken the position that "achieving the result of
such standard," 65 like "measure of protection,' '66 refers to the overall measure of safety protection that the standard provides and not

to the incidental means which the standard requires for achieving
it.67

One ALJ has twice rejected the UMWA's suggested construction

of the "result" language of section 101(c):
It is clear that Congress wished to provide a mechanism for the use of alternative
methods to achieve the same measure of protection afforded by the standard
. . . . That standard may be changed, however, if the new method will guarantee

62. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
63. Id.
64. See Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 292; Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 14
n.9; Quarto Mining Co., No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 11-12 (Apr. 30, 1986) (ALJ Rosenzweig,
appeal pending before Assistant Secretary (filed May 29, 1986)).
For example, the UMWA has pressed the "physical protection" argument in opposing petitions
for modification of 30 C.F.R. § 75.326. Id. That regulation in effect requires that underground coal
mine tunnels (called "entries") containing conveyor belts must be physically isolated from entries
carrying fresh air to working areas (intake entries) and entries exhausting air from working areas to
the surface (return entries) and cannot be used for ventilation purposes; thus, a minimum of three
entries must be developed in coal mines and no positive ventilation can be used in the conveyor belt
entry. The UMWA has contended that the three-entry standard cannot be modified because modifications would not achieve the "result" of 30 C.F.R. § 75.326 maintaining the physical separation
between belt and return entries, or maintaining a low velocity of air in the belt entry. See, e.g.,
UMWA Statement of Objections, Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1 (filed Sept. 9, 1988); Int'l Unioni
(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 292-93.
65. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
66. Id.
67. See Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 293; Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 14
n.9; Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 11-12. In these petitions for modification of 30 C.F.R.
§ 75.326, mine operators have argued that the alternative method of employing two-entry longwall
mining or increasing air velocity in belt entries will provide at least the same, if not more, protection
for the miners from the point of view of fire propagation, early fire warning and detection, and float
coal dust hazards, as would application of 30 C.F.R. § 75.326 at their mines.
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no less than the same measure of protection than the legislated standard. I find
that the use of the word "standard," in the legislative context under consideration
herein, is conceptually equivalent to "method." I further find that the phrase
"measure of protection" relates to the hazards that the legislated standard is
enacted to forestall. Thus, in the legislative history . . . [of § 303(y) of the Act
or 30 C.F.R. § 75.326], then Representative Dent's references to mine fire propagation, lessening of escape time, and float dust control all relate to the "measure
of protection" concept. It is this legislative concept ("measure of protection")
which must remain immutable,12/ although the method ("standard") of achieving
it may change (through a modification proceeding).
12/ Congress, may, of course, legislatively alter the "measure of protection" it
wishes to impose."

In one petition for modification case, the D.C. Circuit was asked
to consider the "result" language of section 101(c); it declined to
do so, remanding the case to the Assistant Secretary with specific
instructions, inter alia, to define the phrase, "achieving the result
of such standard," and to explain the difference, if any, between
that language and the phrase, "no less than the same measure of
protection.' '69
Aside from its connection to the "result" language of the statute,
the phrase "no less than the same measure of protection" raises
separate questions. If an alternative method must provide no less
than the same measure of protection as the standard at a particular
mine, then the safety benefits of the alternative method arguably
should be compared to the safety benefits of the mandatory standard
at a particular mine. One ALJ, in the Kaiser70 case, has held that,
because a mandatory standard represents "MSHA's authorized level
of safety," 7' it must be presumed to be safe unless the protections
it was intended to provide are challenged on diminution of safety
grounds.22 That means that a mandatory standard (for example, 30
C.F.R. section 75.326, a ventilation standard intended to provide
protections related to fire propagation, escape, and float coal dust
control) must be presumed to be safe at least as far as those specific
68.
at 15-16).
69.
70.
71.
72.

Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 12 (quoted in Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op.
Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 293.
Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1.
Id., slip op. at 19.
Id.
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ventilation protections are concerned unless they are challenged on
diminution of safety grounds. 7
However, the ALJ recognized that the level of safety of any
mandatory standard is not an absolute one industry-wide and that,
in meeting its burden under section 101(c), a petitioner may put on
evidence to show the level of safety that the mandatory standard
provides at its mine. The proposed alternative method may then be
compared against that mine-specific level of safety. 74 Although it is
unclear whether the "presumption" of safety of the standard sought
to be modified can be rebutted by showing a level of diminished
safety caused by application of that standard at i particular mine,
the approach set forth by the ALJ in the Kaiser" case seems logical
and calculated to ensure miner safety, given the purpose of section
101(c).76
While some evaluation of the alternative method in light of the
mine-specific level of safety of the mandatory standard must be
required, the precise form of that "measuring" remains uncertain.
Early in the development of the law in this area, the Board of Mine
Operations Appeals ("Board'") 77 first rejected" and later apparently
embraced an approach which "balanced" the safety of the alternative method against the mandatory standard sought to be mod1 the ALJ refined that analysis. She
ified. 79 In Quarto0 and Kaiser,"
1) identified the specific protections which the standard sought to
be modified was intended to provide, based on its legislative history;
2) evaluated the level of safety of those protections provided at the
petitioner's mine; and 3) then compared the level of safety of the
petitioner's alternative method to that mine-specific level of safety.
Based on that analysis, the ALJ granted the petitions in both cases
73. Id. See supra note 64; see infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
74. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 19.
75. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1.
76. H.R. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprintedin 1969 ACT LEalsLATIVE HisToRY
at 1040 (1970).
77. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
78. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 4 I.B.M.A. 130, 135 (1975).

79. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 7 I.B.M.A. 331 (1977); see Quarto Mining Co., M 77-48 (Dec.
5, 1977) (ALJ Michels).
80. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016.

81. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1.
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after concluding that the alternative
methods were as safe as com82
standard.
the
with
pliance
The same approach with a slightly different gloss has been followed in other cases. In Emerald Mines Co.,83 for example, the
Assistant Secretary granted a petition because the proposed alternative provided the same protections as the standard plus some additional safety benefits which were arguably unrelated to the
particular safety standard at issue. 84 The propriety of that approach
remains an open question: in Emerald Mines Co. ,8 the D.C. Circuit
ordered the Assistant Secretary on remand "to analyze the extent
to which the language of section 101(c) permits him to consider
safety benefits derived from the proposed modification that are unrelated to the objectives of the standard.' '86
2.

The Diminution of Safety Standard

Although the diminution of safety standard appears clear, application of thit standard has been a major issue in recent petition
proceedings. It has been held that the "diminution of safety" test
is satisfied if a petitioner can show that there "is a realistic
probability ' 87 that application of the mandatory standard at the petitioner's mine will diminish mine safety. Petitions often have been
granted although the hazard causing diminution of safety was not
one covered by the standard sought to be modified. For example,
mining companies often seek, and are granted, modification of 30

82. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-I, slip op. at 15-20; Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 12.
In Quarto, the ALJ held that the safety of an alternative method as decided in one petition case
cannot be used to demonstrate the safety of the same alternative method in another case involving
a different mine run by a different operator. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 16-17. The ALJ
explained that "[t]he issue of whether an alternative method provides equivalent protection must be
determined within the factual context of each case and is based on the conditions at each mine."
Id. at 16. See also Double Q Corp., No. 81-MS-i, slip op. at 4 (Jan. 20, 1982) (ALJ Thomas).
83. Emerald Mine Corp., No. 83-MSA-17 (Oct. 3, 1985) (Asst. Secretary Zegeer), rev'd and
remandedsub nom. Int'l Union, UMWA v. MSHA (Emerald Mine Corp.), 830 F. 2d 289 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
84. Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 292-93.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 293.
87. Cannelton Industries, Inc., 4 I.B.M.A. 74, 82 (1975).
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C.F.R. section 75.305 8-a ventilation standard-based on proof that
compliance with that ventilation standard exposes miners to unnecessary risk of injury or death from roof falls. Mining activities and
natural "settling" may cause deterioration of the roof in return air
courses which must be examined for adequate ventilation (among
other hazardous conditions) on a weekly basis under section 75.305;
if deteriorating roof conditions pose a hazard to the weekly ex-

aminer, the company may file a petition for modification of this
ventilation standard on diminution of safety grounds to relieve it
of the obligation to examine the air courses by physical inspection.89

Similarly, several mine operators have petitioned for modification of 30 C.F.R. section 75.326-a ventilation standard-because
compliance with the standard would create roof fall hazards thereby
endangering the miners.90 In one case which reached the hearing
stage, the UMWA argued in opposition to the petition that "[i]f

an operator could obtain a modification of a standard intended to
protect ventilation, merely by showing that application of the standard would diminish safety from a ground control perspective, miners would be deprived of the ventilation protection Congress
provided by statute."

91

The ALJ in Kaise9

2

rejected that argument

88. Section 75.305 is a ventilation standard which requires, inter alia, that at least one entry
of each intake and return air course be thoroughly examined each week for hazardous conditions,
including the presence of methane. 30 C.F.R. § 75.305 (1988).
89. See, e.g., Order, Island Creek Coal Co., No. 88-MSA-17 (Sept. 20, 1988) (ALJ Miller);
Bethlehem Mines Corp., No. 78-MS-47 (Jan. 30, 1979) (ALJ Devaney); Kentland-Elkhorn Corp., No.
M 76-489 (Oct. 8, 1978) (ALJ Stewart); Consolidation Coal Co., No. M 77-234, (Mar. 8, 1978) (ALJ
Cook); Eastern Associated Coal Corp., No. M 75-134 (Jan. 4, 1977) (ALJ Broderick). In these cases,
the companies proved that the return air courses at issue could not be rehabilitated safely.
90. See also supra notes 64, 67.
91. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 6 (quoting the UMWA Brief at 4-5).
The same argument was also raised in another petition case. Brief of the UMWA at 5 (filed
Oct. 21, 1987), Utah Power & Light Co., Mining Division, No. 86-MSA-3.
Since the time this article was written, the Asistant Secretary has issued his decision reversing
the AL's November 23, 1987 denial of the petition. While the AJ never addressed this issue, the
Assistant Secretary did and rejected the UMWA's argument, saying
I find that there is nothing in the Legislative history of § 101(c) of the Act or in the statutory
language itself that restricts me to considering only safety factors relating to the purpose
of the standard in question in determining whether application of the standard will result
in a diminution of safety.
Utah Power & Light Co., Mining Division, No. 86-MSA-3, slip. op. at 9 (Jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y
O'Neal).
92. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1.
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and granted a petition which provided roof control benefits, inter
alia, through modification of a ventilation standard. The ALJ apparently found that such a modification was consistent with the Act
based on Congress's recognition that section 101(c) should be imbued with a certain amount of flexibility to improve safety. 93 "While
clear that the protection afforded miners may not be sacrificed in
the name of progress, it is also apparent that Congress did not intend
to place an insurmountable burden on the incorporation of scientific
'94
and technological advances into the mining process.
3. Must Both the Diminution of Safety and Alternative
Method Tests Be Satisfied?
Despite use of the disjunctive word "or" in the statute to separate the two tests for modifying safety standards, there has been
considerable debate over whether both the diminution of safety and
alternative method tests must be satisfied before a petition can be
granted. The question is complicated by the fact that, ultimately,
the grant of modifications is discretionary with the Secretary. 95
Section 101(c) provides that a petition may be granted if the
alternative method or diminution of safety test is satisfied. 96 It has
been argued tlat a petition could only be granted if both tests were
satisfied because the word "or" in the statute really means "and."
Significantly, and despite the fact that pure alternative method petitions have often been granted over the years, this argument appears
to have been raised only where both diminution of safety and alternative method grounds have been alleged in the petition. 97 Although the Assistant Secretary has yet to resolve this issue expressly,
two ALJs have done so.9 Their views differ sharply.

93. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 14 (quoting Reliable Coal Corp. v. Morton, 478
F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1973)).
94. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 14.

95. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d 289; Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-l; Utah Power
& Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Nov. 27, 1987) (ALJ Matera), rev'd (Jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
98. Since the time this article was written in the fall of 1988, the Assistant Secretary has addressed

this issue, holding that
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One ALJ has concluded that the safety of the alternative method
must be satisfied in all petition cases but must be conditioned on
proof of diminution of safety to justify the modification.99 He discussed this "justification" concept as follows:
Thus, it is logical to conclude that modification is warranted only when application
of the regulation frustrates the statutory objective by reducing safety. It would
therefore seem that the UMWA's assertion [that both diminution of safety and
the safety of the alternative method must be shown] is the proper [one for] the
majority of cases. Indeed, one can envision only a rare case where satisfying only
one part of the safety standard would be sufficient to justify modification.10

The AL's analysis poses fundamental problems. To say that "a
rare case" would justify satisfaction of only one statutory burden
is to ignore the statute, as recognized by the United States Court
of Appeals. In addressing a challenge to the Assistant Secretary's
grant of a petition based solely upon the safety of the alternative
method, the D.C. Circuit noted that section 101(c) "also allows such
a modification"' 0'1 on diminution of safety grounds, but that "[t]his
portion of section 101(c) did not serve as the basis for the Assistant
Secretary's decision and is not at issue on appeal."' 02 In addition,
the AL's conclusion apparently did not take account of the numerous petition cases granted solely because the petitioner's alternative method was found to be as safe as the standard. 0 3 Moreover,
both the Congressional intent and the plain language of the statue support the conclusion
that modification may be granted if a petition meets the burden of establishing either that
an alternative method existis which will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure
of protection afforded the miners by the standard or that application of the standard will
result in diminution of safety.
Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3, slip. op. at 8 (Jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
99. The AL's conclusion about the construction of "or" in the statute was dicta as he found
that the petitioner failed to satisfy either statutory burden. Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3, slip
op. at 5 n.3 (Nov. 27, 1987) (ALJ Matera), rev'd (jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
100. Id.
101. Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 290-91 n.1 (emphasis added). See also 30 C.F.R. § 44.11
(1988).
102. Id.
103. Petitions for modification to implement an alternative method as safe, or safer, than the
mandatory standard are far more common that petitions alleging b6th diminution of safety and the
safety of the alternative method. These alternative method petitions are often filed so that technological
advances can be implemented. Some examples are modifications of 1) 36 C.F.R. § 75.326 to permit
use of belt air to ventilate mining faces, and 2) 30 C.F.R. § 75.1103-4(a) to install low level carbon
monoxide early warning fire detection systems instead of point-type heat sensors. See, e.g., Pyro
Mining Co., No. 86-MSA-5 (Sept. 23, 1987) (ALJ Rosenzweig); Quarto Mining, No. M 77-48; 53
Fed. Reg. 10161-68 (1988) (list of petitions granted by the Administrator).
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if a petition could only be granted by showing both diminution of
safety and the safety of the alternative method, then improvements

in technology could never be introduced into the mining industry
through the petition process, as Congress apparently intended, ex-

cept where a diminution of safety also existed.I °4
The other ALJ used a different analysis. 105 She construed "or"

in the statute literally-to mean that a petitioner could have its petition granted if either the diminution of safety or the alternative
method test were satisfied.1 0 6 In analyzing the diminution of safety
standard, however, she recognized that, because any modification
must not reduce the protections afforded the miners, existence of
a safe alternative (or substitute measure) must always be demonstrated where diminution of safety is alleged.10 7
The ALJ refused to adopt the "justification" theory of modi-

fication which would require the petitioner to demonstrate diminution of safety as a condition precedent to the grant of any petition.
In addressing MSHA's "justification" argument in Kaiser,08 she
discussed the interplay between satisfaction of statutory burdens and
the extent of the AL's discretion:
MSHA correctly states that a grant of a petition for modification is a discretionary
act. However, MSHA makes an incorrect assumption as to how that discretion
ought to function. The language of section 101(c) clearly provides that if either
burden-alternative method or diminution of safety -is met, the Secretary "may"

104. See H.R. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 AcT LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY at 1040 (1970); Reliable Coal Corp., 478 F.2d at 262.
105. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1.
106. Id. at 13-14, 18 n.18, 22-24, 183.
107. Id. The phraseology of the AL's analysis-concluding that a safe "alternative" must be
offered-may, at first glance, confuse the issue. Since the statute makes "alternative method" one
of the standards for the grant of a petition, the evidence of the efficacy (or insufficiency) of a
replacement measure in a pure alternative method case may be different, indeed, from the evidence
supporting (or contesting) an allegation that the alternative method test is met in a diminution of
safety case. This semantic problem would be solved if the measures offered to replace a standard
that diminishes safety were called "replacement" or "substitute" measures.
The Assistant Secretary, in granting a petition solely on diminution of safety grounds, held
that he need not consider whether the alternative method test was also satisfied; however, he did in
his discretion include in his order granting the petition "special terms and conditions to assume
adequate protection to the miners." Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3, slip op. at 9-10 (Jul. 14,
1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
108. Id.
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modify the mandatory safety standard in question. MSHA's interpretation, however, refashions these burdens in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act. Thus, the discretion provided by the statute does not extend to a reconstruction of the statutory burdens so as to make satisfaction of one burden (alternative method) dependent upon satisfaction of the other (diminution of safety)."19

Instead of finding that satisfaction of one burden was conditioned
on the other, 110 ALJ Rosenzweig found that satisfaction of one burden-alternative method-permitted her to use her discretion to con-

sider the other-diminution of safety-as an additionalbasis upon
which to grant the petition.'
The conclusion in this regard is somewhat strained, but neces-

sarily so, given the practicalities of the petition process-MSHA will
no doubt always require that an alternative (or substitute) method
be proposed. If "or" in the statute really means "or," then it should

make no difference which standard the petitioner satisfies: diminution of safety or safety of the alternative method. But if only

diminution of safety were alleged and proved so that the mandatory
standard would not be enforced at a particular mine, the question
arises as to what should take the mandatory standard's place, as-

suming that the protections afforded by that standard are not sufficiently addressed by compliance with other mandatory safety
standards. Answering that question would not be problematic if pe-

titions were decided at the hearing stage by a trier of fact with
expertise in mine safety. Such a trier of fact could use that expertise

109. Id. at 22.
110. See Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3, slip op. at 5 n.3 (Nov. 27, 1987) (ALJ Matera),
rev'd (Jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
111. Id. at 13-14, 18 n.18, 22-24, 183.
One ALJ used his discretion to require a petitioner to comply with additional conditions to make
the alternative method in its original petition safer than the standard:
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to permit modifications of regulated standards

if the miner is afforded the same measure of protection under the alternative method.
However, it is within the Act's contemplation that if MSHA determines that a few economically and technologically feasible extra features will improve the safety of an existing
mandatory standard, it can require that those features be added.
Double Q, No. 81-MS-l, slip op. at 8. This kind of reasoning seems to take too far the "technology
forcing" goal of the Act. While it makes sense to permit operators to petition for modification of
a mandatory standard to implement technological improvements, it is yet another thing to suggest
that MSHA be permitted to impose technological improvements beyond the requirements of the mandatory safety standard sought to be modified without following the procedures of § 101(a) rulemaking.
See infra 137-42 and accompanying text.
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to develop conditions for an alternative/substitute method, much as
the Administrator does now when changing or adding to conditions
proposed by the petitioner in its alternative/substitute method. How112
ever, many Department of Labor ALJs do not have that expertise.
Moreover, from a practical point of view, most petitioners who allege diminution of safety will propose substitute safety measures in
their petitions to avoid giving MSHA an opportunity to impose
measures that might be impossible to implement.
At present, it is unclear what must be proved to satisfy the statutory burdens in a petition case. Thus, parties suffer because no
one can be sure what it takes to prove a petition case, as judges
have trouble figuring out what the law requires. At best, the consequence is a long, laborious presentation of testimony and exhibits
by each party in an attempt to support its side of the case; at worst,
good ideas may not be implemented, and miners may continue to
be exposed to unnecessary risks.
B.

ProceduralMorass

In addition to the confusion over satisfaction of the statutory
burdens, the petition process itself can be a procedural morass characterized by delays in litigation and decision making replete with
unresolved issues.
1. The Department of Labor ALJs
Under the 1969 Act, petition for modification cases were decided
by the Secretary of the Interior through his delegate, the Interior
Board of Mine Operations Appeals-the same agency which decided
mine safety enforcement, discrimination, and compensation cases.1 13
112. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.

113. See 30 U.S.C. § 816 (1976) (§ 106 of the 1969 Act).
Because both enforcement cases and petition cases were decided by the Board, under the 1969

Act, an operator could have a petition for modification considered as part of an enforcement proceeding. For example, in Carbon Fuel Co., 6 I.B.M.A. 20 (1976), the mine operator challenged an
alleged violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1712-2, which provided that bath house facilities be convenient

and centrally located. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1712-2 (1988). In addition, claiming that the time set for abatement of the alleged violation was unreasonable, the operator filed a motion for extension of abatement
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Decisionmakers in petition for modification proceedings thus developed both technical and legal expertise in mine safety and health
matters. However, under the 1977 Act, administration of the Act
was transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor, and jurisdiction over most mine safety disputes
was transferred to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission"), an independent federal adjudicatory agency
with judges experienced in mine safety. 114 Section 301(c) of the 1969
Act" 5 was recodified verbatim as section 101(c) of the 1977 Act, 16
but under the 1977 Act, "Secretary" means Secretary of Labor, not
Secretary of the Interior." 7 Jurisdiction to consider petitions for
modification thus moved to the Secretary of Labor, and adjudication
of petition disputes was not transferred along with other mine safety
disputes to the Commission, where judicial expertise in this technical
field lies.
The Department of Labor's Office of Administrative Law Judges
now hears petition for modification disputes. These ALJs typically
hear black lung benefits cases,"' longshoremen's compensation
cases, 1 9 job training partnership (formerly "CETA") discrimination
and audit cases, 120 and whistle-blower cases brought under a number
of other statutes.' 2' Most of these ALJs are not familiar with mining
operations, much less with the statutory burdens for petitions, the
Part 44 procedural rules, mining terminology, or the whole mine
safety law milieu. A major burden is imposed on the parties in
petition for modification cases since they must "teach" the ALJ
time, as well as a petition for modification, averring that the operator's bathhouse facilities were no
less safe than the standard. The ALJ decided that the operator had not violated the cited standard,
making any consideration of the petition moot; the Board affirmed. Id. at 25-27. See also Reliable
Coal Corp., 1 I.B.M.A. 97 (1972), aff'd on other groundssub nom. Reliable Coal Corp. v. Morton,
478 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1973).

114. The first Commission ALJs were transferred from the Secretary of Interior's Office of
Hearings and Appeals, which had, inter alia, jurisdiction to decide mine safety disputes and contested
petitions for modification arising under the 1969 Act. 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(2) (1982).

115. 30 U.S.C. § 861(c) (1976).
116. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1982).
117. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1976) and 30 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1982).

118. 30 U.S.C. § 932a (1982).
119. 33 U.S.C. §§ 919, 921 (1982).
120. 29 US.C. § 1576 (1982).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9, 7622 (1982).
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about the rudiments of mining (including the basics of such disciplines as geology, rock mechanics, mine ventilation, electricity,
equipment maintenance, mining procedures, and safety measures in
relevant areas) before the AU can begin to understand the issues.
This foundational phase can be time-consuming because the parties
dare not omit any preliminary material which may affect the ALJ's
understanding of the ultimate issues in the case. Moreover, not only
does laying an extensive conceptual foundation delay relief and add
to overall litigation costs, but it also leads to frustration on the part
of the parties as well as the judge as it tends to bury the real issues
in a heap of general mining lore. At bottom, this "educational"
process complicates and extends petition hearings and could result
in decisions that may suffer from a serious lack of perspective, even
if they are not internally inconsistent or otherwise functionally defective.
2.

Protracted Nature of Litigation

The petition process should ensure that worthy petitions will be
granted quickly. With respect to petitions based on diminution of
safety, for example, mining should be able to proceed safely without
forcing mining companies to make a Hobson's choice: if the petition
is not granted, the company can either 1) choose not to comply with
the mandatory standard and risk MSHA enforcement action, 2)
comply with the standard and risk endangering the miners, or 3)
shut down operations and lay off the workforce until the petition
is decided. In alternative method cases, the company may be forced
to use a "second best" method of mining to comply with a standard
while awaiting a decision that will enable a superior method to be
used. As it stands now, the petition process is unresponsive to these
dilemmas.

122

The petition process can take years. For example, in Quarto Mining Co.,1 2 the petition was filed on September 27, 1982. It was

122. Interim relief from enforcement of a mandatory standard while a petition is pending is no
longer available. Int'l Union, UMWA v. MSHA, (Kaiser Coal Corp.), 823 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
[hereinafter Int'l Union/(Kaiser)]. See infra notes 143-67 and accompanying text.
123. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016.
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referred for investigation on December 16, 1982; the notice of investigative report was issued on January 18, 1983. The Administrator
denied the petition on July 6, 1983, and Quarto requested a hearing.
The case was heard in June, 1985 and decided on April 30, 1986.
Cross-appeals from that decision were filed on May 29 and 30, 1986

and were still pending before the Assistant Secretary in the spring
of 1989-over six years after the petition was filed. 124 The system
works more quickly, however, if a hearing is not requested.
One reason for such a protracted process is that the regulations
impose no time limits on the various stages of decision making.
MSHA can take its time investigating the petition; the Administrator
can take his time in deciding it; if a hearing is requested, the ALJ
can take his time in setting a hearing date, hearing the case, and
deciding it;125 and the Assistant Secretary can do (and has done) 1 6
the same.
As a comparison of timetables in a number of cases reveals, the
most serious problem is not with MSHA (at least from the Administrator on down), which seems to be able to decide apetition
in about ten months, but rather with the ALJs and especially with
the Assistant Secretary. The discovery and hearing process in petition
cases is lumbering; from the time a request for hearing is filed until
the time an ALJ issues a decision can (and probably will) take years.2 7
124. In Emerald Mines, No. 83-MSA-17, the petition was filed on July 29, 1982 and ultimately
granted by the Assistant Secretary on October 3, 1985. While an appeal to the D.C. Circuit was
pending, the petition took effect, but the D.C. Circuit vacated the Assistant Secretary's grant of thd
petition and remanded it two years later. Int'l Union/(Emerald), 830 F.2d at 290. Over six years
following its filing, that petition is still awaiting decision. See also KaiserCoal, No. 86-MSA-1 (petition
filed May 7, 1985, appeal pending before Assistant Secretary); Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA3 (petition filed Aug. 23, 1985, decided by Assistant Secretary, Jul. 14, 1989). Frustrated with thd
Assistant Secretary's delay in issuing a decision, one mining company has filed a petition for writ
of mandamus with the D.C. Circuit, requesting that the Secretary be ordered to decide the petition
one way or the other. In re Utah Power & Light Co., Mining Division, Docket No. 89.1311 (filed
D.C. Cir. May 12, 1989). One day before the secretary was required to file her court-ordered response
to the mandamus petition, a decision on the mdrits of the petition was issued by the Assistant Secretary,
mooting the mandamus proceeding.
125. The Office of Administratie Law Judges has been plagued for yeart by a major backlog
of black lung benefits clainis, despite congressional demands that the multi-year delays be eliminated.
Petition for modification cases get no priority and must generally take their place in line behind these
pending cases.
126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
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Moreover, there is no mechanism under the Part 44 rules for an

expedited proceeding. 128 Even when petitioners have moved for an
expedited proceeding under the rules of the Department of Labor's
Office of Administrative Law Judges, 129 that Office has been slow

to respond. 30 Commission procedure offers a sharp contrast. 3'
Commission Rule 52,132 which is invoked regularly in mine safety

enforcement cases, provides for an expedited hearing before a Commission ALJ on four days' notice or even sooner if all parties agree.

Notwithstanding the snail's pace at which the Office of Administrative Law Judges operates, the real black hole in the petition
process is in the Assistant Secretary's office. First, the Assistant
Secretary and staff simply do not seem able or willing to decide
1 33
technical and complicated petition cases.

Agency records reflect that in the last eleven years, the Assistant
Secretary has decided only one petition case on the merits, a decision
that was vacated by the D.C. Circuit for an insufficient explanation
13 4
of reasons. The case is now before the Assistant Secretary again.
Second, in the wake of the Wilberg Mine fire, 135 MSHA and the
Assistant Secretary have been the subject of recent congressional

128. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
129. 29 C.F.R. § 18.42 (1988).
130. In one case, a motion for expedited proceeding filed on June 24, 1988 requesting a hearing
beginning July 12, 1988 was denied because the miners were on vacation during that period; the
motion was denied three days after the requested starting date of the hearing. A renewed motion for
expedited proceedings was filed on July 29 and was granted. The hearing was held on September 14,
1988-almost three months after the motion for expedition had been filed. See Island Creek, No.
88-MSA-17.
In another case, the mine operator filed a motion for expedited proceedings based on delays in
mining operations and the idlement which would result if the petition were not granted. The ALJ
denied the motion, explaining that "[these general statements of possible adverse affects are insufficient to demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if Petitioner's Motion were not granted. Order
Denying Motion for Expedited Proceedings, Consolidation Coal Co., No. 88-MSA-1 (Jan. 7, 1988)
(ALJ Vittone). As a partial result of that ruling, the mine was idled not long thereafter.
131. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.1 - 2700.84 (1987).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.52 (1987).
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. Emerald Mine Corp., No. 83-MSA-17 (Oct. 3, 1985) (Asst. Sec. Zegeer), vacated and remanded sub nom. Int'l Union, UMWA v. MSHA (Emerald Mine Corp.), 830 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
135. Twenty-seven miners died when a fire broke out in the Wilberg Mine near Orangeville,
Utah, on December 19, 1984.
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oversight and bitingcriticism. 13 6 Like a deer frozen in a hunter's spotlight, the intensity of congressional oversight has apparently para-

lyzed the decisionmaking capability of the Assistant Secretary. This
paralysis ill serves the nation's miners and mining companies, who
are effectively denied the section 101(c) relief provided by Congress.
3. Unintended Uses of the Petition Process
The petition process suffers from certain deficiencies which permit it to be used in a manner not intended by Congress. Two of
those deficiencies are considered below.
First, the system permits one party to exercise its procedural
rights in order to prevent a granted petition from being implemented.
If the Administrator grants a petition, it will not become effective
if the opposing party merely requests a hearing within thirty days
or if the opposing party appeals an ALJ's grant of a petition to

the Assistant Secretary. The problem is more significant today than
it was when the regulations were promulgated since the original mechanisms for relief from enforcement of a mandatory standard while
a petition is pending are no longer available: the regulations authorizing a grant of interim relief have been invalidated, and no
applicant has yet.been granted relief pending appeal. 137 Given the
already protracted nature of the process, these automatic roadblocks
give one party the ability to hold a petition hostage to that party's
demands, which may or may not be directly cognizable under the
law. Second, miners have recently sought to use their right to petition for modification under section 101(c), not to ensure that the
protection intended by a standard is not diminished at their mine,
but rather to force some mining companies to use equipment or
mining methods which the miners believe are safer than the standard
requires. These miners' petitions seem geared toward an industrywide rewriting of the mandatory standard sought to be modified,

136. See Mine Safety-"The Wilberg Incident": HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Labor
& Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Hearings on Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984,

Orangeville, UT Hearings of the Subcomm. on Health & Safety of the House Comm. on Education
& Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
137. See infra notes 143-81 and accompanying text.
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rather than to mine-specific problems created by application of the
standard.1 8 These petitions can therefore be viewed as attempts to
circumvent the requirements of section 101(a) rulemaking under the
Act. For example, two petitions were filed by miners to modify 30
C.F.R. section 75.1707 at Consolidation Coal's Ireland Mine and
Clinchfield Coal's McClure No. 1 Mine. 39 Section 75.1707 requires
that intake escapeways be separated from belt entries and trolley
haulage entries of a mine.14° Although nothing in the regulation prohibits use of diesel or battery-powered equipment in those intake
entries, these petitions sought such a prohibition. The Administrator
4
held that the petitions were improper and denied them:' '
The two petitions dismissed by the enclosed orders do not propose to modify the
application of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1707 at either mine. These petitions instead propose
to revise the standard itself, expanding it to add proscriptions on possible fire
sources in intake air escapeways. Indeed, if the operator of either mine removed
fire sources from the intake air escapeways as the UMWA proposes, a petition
for modification would be unnecessary since the result would be in compliance
with the standard. We do not believe that this is a proper application of the
Section 101(c) petition for modification procedures.
A modification of the standard in the manner proposed by the dismissed petitions
42
is in the nature of general rulemaking under Section 101(a) of the Mine Act.

138. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. (UMWA), No. 88-MSA-24 (Petition No. M-88-10-C published at 53 Fed. Reg. 4,789 (1988)); Clinchfield Coal Co. (UMWA), No. 88-MSA-22 (Petition No.
M-88-11-C published at 53 Fed. Reg. 4,790 (1988)); Florence Mining Co. (UMWA), Docket No. M88-9-C, 53 Fed. Reg. 4,790 (1988).
139. Consolidation Coal, No. 88-MSA-24; Clinchfield Coal, No. 88-MSA-22.
140. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1707 (1988).
141. Order of Dismissal (No. M-88-10-C), Consolidation Coal, No. 88-MSA-24 (May 2, 1988);
Order of Dismissal (No. M-88-11-C), Clinchfield Coal, No. 88 MSA-22 (May 2, 1988).
142. Cover letter from J. Spicer to M. Jordan (April 25, 1988) (enclosing Orders of Dismissal
in Consolidation Coal, No. 88-MSA-24 (May 2, 1988) and Clinchfield Coal, No. 88-MSA-22 (May
2, 1988)).
Nor do there appear to be any mine-specific factors which would warrant granting of the other
petition filed by the miners to date. In that case, modification of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1103-4 was sought
at the Florence No. 1 Mine. Florence Mining Co. (UMWA), Docket No. M-88-9-C. That regulation
requires that point-type heat sensors be installed along each belt flight of a belt line to alert the
miners to the presence of a fire. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1103-4 (1988). These sensors respond to the heat
generated by a fire. The petition sought to supplement point-type heat sensors with a low level carbon
monoxide mine monitoring system in all belt entries used as intake and return air courses and on all
belt drives and tailpieces located in intake entries. 53 Fed. Reg. at 4,790-91 (1988). While the new
low level carbon monoxide mine monitoring systems represent an advance in technology over pointtype heat sensors, heat sensors are all that the current regulations require. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1103-4
(1988); see, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 2,397-2,400 (1988) (proposed rules for new ventilation standards). Again,
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Since the problem which the miners sought to address in their
petitions would be appropriately addressed by industry-wide rule143
making, a petition for modification would not be proper.
C. Interim Relief and Relief Pending Appeal

As discussed above, 144 a petitioner must continue to operate under the original mandatory standard while its petition is pendingeven in cases where MSHA has determined that its proposed alternative is safer than the standard. The need for "interim relief" is
particularly acute when the reason for the petition is to protect miners from hazards caused by application of the standard at the affected mine. Although several mechanisms might theoretically provide
relief, the availability of interim relief is extremely limited as a prac145
tical matter.
A review of Part 44 suggests that obtaining preliminary relief

from enforcement of a mandatory standard prior to issuance of a
final decision should not be a problem, especially where the Ad-

ministrator has already granted the petition. Ostensibly, provision
has been made for both interim relief and relief pending appeal, but
post-promulgation problems have crippled them. Notwithstanding
the regulations, there may be a third option-emergency reliefwhose viability has not yet been fully tested.
this regulatory agenda is appropriate for industry-wide rulemaking, not mine-specific petitions for
modification. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. at 2,397-2,400, 2,418-19 (1988). The petition was dismissed for
a different reason, however: the key factual allegation-that the mine used belt entries to ventilate
working faces-was no longer true. Order of Dismissal, Florence Mining, Docket No. M-88-9-C (Oct.
11, 1988).
143. See 53 Fed. Reg. 2,422-23 (1988) (proposed rules for new ventilation standards).
144. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
145. In MSHA Policy Memorandum No. 81-22-C (Jan. 29, 1981), MSHA indicated that enforcement of a mandatory standard may be stayed in effect while a petition is pending. Normally,
if an MSHA inspector finds a violation of a mandatory safety standard, the inspector will issue a
§ 104(a) citation. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1982). Failure to correct the condition cited in the citation will
result in a § 104(b), 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1982), failure to abate order, closing the mine or the section
affected by the order. This scenario would not be altered by the filing of a petition; that is, the
pendency of a petition would not prevent MSHA from taking enforcement action for violating the
standard sought to be modified. However, the MSHA Policy Memorandum states that, if a citation
is issued while a petition is pending, the abatement then may be extended until a decision is reached
on the petition "where it is alleged in good faith that application of such standard will result in a
diminution of safety to the miners." Id. See Gateway Coal Co., 1 I.B.M.A. 82 (1972); Reliable, I
I.B.M.A. 97.
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1.

Interim Relief

Section 44.16146 of the regulations provides that interim relief
from enforcement of a mandatory standard may be granted if the
applicant can
clearly show that (1) the petition seeking modification has been filed in good
faith, and the applicant is not using the proceeding solely to postpone or avoid
abatement; (2) the requested relief will not adversely affect the health or safety
of the miners in the affected mine; and (3) there is a substantial likelihood that
the decision on the merits of the petition for modification will be favorable to
the applicant1 47

Under the Secretary's regulation, an application for interim relief
can be filed at any stage of the petition proceedings so long as a
final decision on the petition has not been issued. 148 The regulation
further provides that the Administrator, Assistant Secretary, or ALJ
before whom the application is pending may (but is not required
to) hold a hearing before deciding an interim relief request. 149 Although the regulation permits appeal from a denial of interim relief,
it does not permit a disappointed party appeal from a grant of
interim relief. 50
Despite absence of a regulation permitting it, the UMWA appealed to the Assistant Secretary the Administrator's grant of interim
relief to two mining companies who had petitioned for modification
of section 75.326 to permit two-entry mining. In both cases, the
Assistant Secretary refused to consider the appeals because the regulations made no provision for an appeal from a grant of interim
relief.15 ' The UMWA appealed the Assistant Secretary's refusal to
52
the D.C. Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit vacated the Administrator's grant of interim
relief to the two mining companies. In InternationalUnion, UMWA
v. MSHA (Kaiser Coal Corp.) [hereinafter "Int'l Union/(Kai146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

30 C.F.R.
30 C.F.R.
30 C.F.R.
30 C.F.R.
30 C.F.R.
Id.
Id.

§ 44.16 (1988).
§ 44.16(e) (1988).
§ 44.16(a) (1988).
§ 44.16(h) (1988).
§ 44.16(c); Int'l Union/(Kaiser), 823 F.2d at 613.
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ser)"];'5 the court held that the SecretAry's interim relief regulations
were inconsistent with section 101(c) of the Act because 1) there was
no requirement that a hearing be held before granting interim relief
from enforcement of a mandatory standard, 2) the duration of interim relief was not limited by the regulations, and 3) interim relief
could be granted on a lesser showing than diminution of safety. 154
The Secretary has never formally revoked the interim relief regulations. As a result of the Int'l Union/(Kaiser)'"5 decision, however, it seems clear that the Administrator, the Assistant Secretary,
and some ALJs understandably regard the current interim relief re16
gulations as a dead letter.
Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated the current interim relief
regulations, it nonetheless recognized the need for some vehicle to
ensure miner safety during the pendency of a petition for modification, particularly when that safety could be compromised by application of the standard at that mine.'51 Consistent with the purpose
of the Act in general and of section 101(c) in particular, the D.C.
Circuit left the door open to fill the void its invalidation of the
Secretary's current interim relief regulations created. The court limited
the effect of its decision by saying that it did not address the question
"whether [outside of the current interim relief regulations] the Secretary would have authority to grant interim relief.

. .

when there

is a possibility that application of the standard will increase the
danger to miners . . .,,1" or "in an 'emergency' situation.'

' 159

Curiously, the D.C. Circuit's words harken back to those used
by the Board in Gateway Coal Co.' 60 which, prior to promulgation
of Part 44, provided for a stay of enforcement of a mandatory
153. Id. at 608.
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. See, e.g., Decision of the Assistant Secretary at 7-9, Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA3, (Aug. 14, 1987); Order Denying Petitioner's Application for Relief Pending Appeal and Expedited
Proceedings at 7-9, Kaiser Coal Corp., No. 88-MSA-5 (Apr. 22, 1988) (ALJ Rosenzweig).

157. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
158. Int'l Union/(Kaiser), 823 F.2d at 617 n.6.
159. Id. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of "emergency relief."
160. Gateway, I I.B.M.A. 82.
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standard at a mine during the pendency of a petition. In light of
the D.C. Circuit's invalidation of the Secretary's interim relief regulations, it may be time for petitioners to dust off and actively
pursue the Board's Gateway161 stay rationale. Before Part 44 even
existed, the Board held in Gateway Coal Co. 162 that implicit in section 301(c) of the 1969 Act (mirrored by section 101(c) of the 1977
Act) was the power to grant interim relief from enforcement of a
mandatory safety standard "by restraining the Bureau [of Mines,
responsible for mine safety enforcement at that time] from enforcement action under section 104(b) of the Act relating to the safety
standard which is the subject of a pending petition for modification
under section 301(c)." 163 In effect, the Gateway'" stay was simply
an extension of the abatement time specified in a section 104(a)
citation (called a "notice of violation" under the 1969 Act) until
the petition could be decided. 65 The Board.held that interim relief
from enforcement of a mandatory standard could be issued during
the pendency of a petition after an opportunity for a hearing, if
three criteria were met: 1) the petition was filed in good faith and
was not used solely to postpone or avoid abatement, 2) the safety
of the miners would be ensured "during the period of restraint,"
and 3) the petitioner would suffer irreparable harm if interim relief
166
were not granted.
A Gateway stay may be a viable option for petitioners to obtain
interim relief even though jurisdiction over mine safety disputes now
rests with the Commission and not with the Secretary of the Interior
161. Id.
162. Id.

163. Id. at 91.
164. Gateway, I I.B.M.A. 82.
165. The Board echoed this view in Reliable, I I.B.M.A. 97. Cf. Kanawha Coal Co. v. Andrus,
553 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1977).
166. At the time Gateway was decided, it was not contemplated that the miners would file
petitions for modification. See supra note 17. The three tests stated in Gateway were phrased in terms
.of the "operator," not the "petitioner," and the question arises as to whether miners, as petitioners,
could seek a Gateway stay. The answer is complicated as miners do not have the same rights as
mining companies to challenge enforcement actions. Miners may not initiate a challenge to a § 104(a)
citation, though they may challenge the reasonableness of abatement time specified in the citation.
30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1986). Since the Gateway stay is tantamount to an extension of abatement time,
the miners' right to challenge the reasonableness of that abatement time arguably should give them
sufficient standing to seek such a stay.
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as it did under the 1969 Act. 167 The Board in Gateway granted an
extension of the abatement time specified in a 1969 Act section 104(a)
citation such that no section 104(b) closure order could be issued.
168
The Commission also has that power.
2.

Relief Pending Appeal

The regulations contain another mechanism for relief from enforcement of a mandatory standard while the "appeal" of a petition
(from a decision of either the Administrator or an ALJ) is pend-

ing. 69 The availability of such relief is necessary because neither the
Administrator's nor an AL's decision will be effective if an "appeal" is filed. 70 However, unlike a request for interim relief, which
can be filed at any stage before the issuance of a final decision,1
relief pending appeal can be filed only after the Administrator or
ALJ has issued a decision because the purpose of relief pending

appeal is to give effect to that decision during pendency of the appeal. 172
The term "appeal" as used in 30 C.F.R. section 44.50 is imprecise because a request for hearing initiates a proceeding de novo
on the petition itself-not a review of the proposed decision and
order-before the Department of Labor ALJ to whom the case is
assigned.173 Moreover, an appeal to the Assistant Secretary from an

167. The Gateway decision is still good law. Under the savings provision of the 1977 Act, Board
decisions remain in effect until revoked, modified, or superseded by the Commission. 30 U.S.C. §
961(a)(2) (1982). The Commission has never taken any such action with regard to Gateway.
168. 30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1986). The Commission has the power to affirm, modify, or vacate
a citation, order, or civil penalty, or "[direct] other appropriate relief." Id. A petitioner can ask for
a Gateway stay only in the context of an enforcement proceeding. See description of enforcement
proceedings, supra note 144.
169. 30 C.F.R. § 44.50 (1988).
170. 30 C.F.R. § 44.50(a) (1988).
171. 30 C.F.R. § 44.16(a) (1988).
172. 30 C.F.R. § 44.50(b)(1). The filing deadline for relief pending appeal creates a procedural
anomaly. An application for relief pending appeal must be filed within ten days of the issuance of
the Administrator's or AIJ's decision granting the petition. 30 C.F.R. § 44.50(b)(2) (1988). However,
a party opposing the grant of the petition has 30 days in which to file a request for hearing or appeal
to the Assistant Secretary. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.14, 44.33(a) (1988). Thus, a petitioner must file an application for relief pending appeal well before it knows whether a hearing will be requested or an
appeal will be filed.
173. 30 C.F.R. §§ 44.15, 44.32(b) (1988); Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-1, slip op. at 3.
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ALJ decision also triggers something more than a mere review of
whether that decision was supported by substantial evidence. t74

To obtain relief pending appeal, the regulations provide that
"[b]efore relief [pending appeal] is granted, the applicant must clearly
show that (1) the requested relief will not adversely affect the health
or safety of the miners in the affected mine, and (2) there is a
substantial likelihood that the decision on appeal will be favorable
to the applicant."75
The validity of these regulations has been questioned because
they arguably contain some of the same deficiencies that the D.C.
Circuit found fatal in the current interim relief regulations. 7 6 While
validity of the relief pending appeal regulations has never been decided by the Assistant Secretary or the D.C. Circuit,'" no petitioner
has been granted relief pending appeal since the D.C. Circuit decided
Int'l Union/(Kaiser)7 8 in July, 1987.
As one ALJ explained in denying an application for relief pending appeal, "I find that the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
. . . in light of the Court of Appeals decision in International
Union-does not confer authority on me to give effect to the relief
pending appeal and expedited proceeding regulations found at 30
C.F.R. section 44.50."179

174. The regulations provide that the Assistant Secretary, based upon consideration of the entire
record of the proceedings[,] . . .may affirm, modify, or set aside, in whole or part, the findings,
conclusions, and rule or order contained in the decision of the presiding administrative law judge
and shall include a statement of reasons for the action taken.
30 C.F.R. § 44.35 (1988).
175. 30 C.F.R. § 44.50(b)(6) (1988).
176. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
177. Order Denying Petitioner's Application for Relief Pending Appeal and Expedited Proceedings, Kaiser Coal, No. 88-MSA-5; see also Order Denying Applications for Relief Pending Appeal
an4 Expedited Hearings, Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Nos. 88-MSA-19, 88-MSA-20 (Jun. 10, 1988)
(ALJ Avery).
178. Int'l Union/(Kaiser), 823 F.2d 608.
179. Order Denying Petitioner's Application for Relief Pending Appeal and Expedited Proceedings at 3, Kaiser Coal, No. 88-MSA-5; see also Order Denying Applications for Relief Pending
Appeal and Expedited Hearings, Jim Walter, Nos. 88-MSA-19, 88-MSA-20.
Though she declined to grant relief pending appeal as beyond the scope of her authority, the
ALJ took great pains to point out, "I note that I have not found the regulations at issue invalid or
unconstitutional-only that the Act and the court's opinion have placed the granting of 'temporary
relief' beyond the scope of my authority." Order Denying Petitioner's Application for Relief Pending
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Although technically the ALJ, as the Secretary's delegate, was
required to give effect to the Secretary's regulations governing relief
pending appeal, 180 the ultimate result might well have been the same

if the case had been appealed to the D.C. Circuit. In any case, it
appears that the Secretary is similarly concerned with the validity
of her relief pending appeal regulations in light of Int'l Union!
(Kaiser)181 and may cure such deficiencies in her soon to be released
proposed rules for 30 C.F.R. Part 44.182
D.

The New Remedy: Emergency Relief

Even though the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Secretary's interim
relief regulations, the court acknowledged that the Secretary's responsibility for safeguarding the miners may include the power to
grant interim relief from enforcement of a mandatory safety standard "if essential to further the purpose of the Mine Act or under
other compelling circumstances.'1 83 The Assistant Secretary has con84
firmed that he has that inherent power.
Appeal and Expedited Proceedings at 9 n.6, Kaiser Coal, No. 88-MSA-5. Another ALJ denied relief
pending appeal based on Int'l Unionl(Kaiser, as well as on a strained construction of the phrase
"pending appeal." Order on Application for Relief Pending Appeal, Utah Power & Light, No. 86
MSA-3 (Aug. 21, 1987) (ALJ Matera). Because its grant of interim relief had been invalidated by
the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Int'l Unionl(Kaiser), Utah Power & Lighi ["UP&L"] filed for relief
pending appeal out of time to give effect to the Administrator's grant of the petition even though
a hearing before an ALJ had already been held. UP&L argued, inter alia, that the ten-day filing
deadline was a procedural one which could be waived by the agency. The ALJ disagreed:
The nature of the relief afforded by [§ 44.50] is to aid a party during the period of time
after a decision has been rendered but before it has been heard by the subsequent appellate
tribunal; the regulation is entitled "application for relief pending appeal." 30 C.F.R. §
44.50(b)(2) (emphasis added). Since in effect the appeal, from the decision of the Administrator, has been taken and the hearing has been had, what is "pending," for the purposes
of this section, is the decision on appeal, not the appeal itself. This whole subpart is designed
to operate while the case is between tribunals.
Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3, slip op. at 4. The ALJ appears to have misconstrued the purpose
of § 44.50. That section is "designed to operate" while there is no final decision, not while the case
is "between tribunals." In addition, in common legal parlance, "pending appeal" means awaiting a
decision on the appeal. The ALl's reasoning seems to confuse the concepts of "hearing" and "appeal."
The appeal was, in fact, pending before him, although the hearing had been completed.
180. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959);
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
181. Int'l Union/(Kaiser, 823 F.2d 608.
182. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
183. Intl Union/(Kaiser), 823 F.2d at 619 n.8.
184. Decision of the Assistant Secretary, Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Aug. 14, 1987)
(Asst. Sec'y McMillan). The Secretary of Labor agrees. See 54 Fed. Reg. 19, 493.
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One mining company has asked the Assistant Secretary to issue
emergency relief from enforcement of a mandatory standard to ensure the miners' safety during pendency of a petition for modification. 18 5 That company, UP&L, had petitioned for modification of
section 75.326 to permit two-entry mining in its Utah mines. UP&L
applied for and was granted interim relief from enforcement of section 75.326, which enabled it to mine with two entries while its
petition was pending. The interim relief, however, was limited to a
discrete geographic area, and UP&L mined out the longwall panels
in the area covered by interim relief. The company asked to extend
interim relief for two-entrymining to additional areas, but the ALJ
before whom the petition itself was pending denied the request because a hearing on the merits of the petition had not yet been held. 186
The company then appealed the ALJ's denial of interim relief to
the Assistant Secretary.
Before the Assistant Secretary could decide the appeal, the D.C.
Circuit vacated UP&L's initial grant of interim relief and held the
Secretary's interim relief regulations invalid. 87 Nonetheless, the Assistant Secretary held that he still had the authority to grant interim
relief to safeguard the miners or in any other emergency situations
88
and remanded the issue to the ALJ for findings.
On remand, the ALJ considered the question of extended interim
relief along with the merits of the petition; he denied both. 89 UP&L
appealed the ALJ decision on the merits and also applied for emergency relief from enforcement of section 75.326, asking the Assistant
Secretary to use his inherent authority under the Act to safeguard
the miners. The request for emergency relief has now been pending
before the Assistant Secretary for well over a year. 90
185. Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3.
186. Order Denying Interim Relief, Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Apr. 27, 1987) (ALJ

Matera).
187. Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Nov. 23, 1987) (ALJ Matera).

188. Decision of the Assistant Secretary, Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Aug. 14, 1987)
(Asst, Sec. MeMillan).
189. Utah Power & Light, No. 86-MSA-3 (Nov. 23, 1987) (ALJ Matera).

190, After this article was written, the request for emergency relief was rendered moot by the
Assistant Secretary's issuance of a decision on the merits of the pettion, Utah Power & Light, No.
86-MSA-3, slip op. at 1, n.2 (Jul. 14, 1989) (Asst. Sec'y O'Neal).
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Thus, the two regulatory mechanisms intended to provide relief
while petitions are pending have been rendered useless. But because
the need for interim relief still exists, the search is on for a way to
obtain it.
IV.

SOLUTIONS

Experience suggests that three avenues are available to a party
whose petition is (or may become) stalled in the procedural quagmire. One solution-settlement-exists within the current petition
framework; the others-rulemaking and legislation-entail significant reform of the existing process.
A.

Settlement

Settlement may be worthy of consideration in cases where half
a loaf today may be worth more than an entire loaf years later.
Moreover, where highly technical issues are involved, settlement is
often the best method of dispute resolution in a petition case. For
example, while the parties will have the background to understand
the nuances of the case, the ALJ may not be similarly situated, even
after the taking of evidence. Even if a petition is granted, the actual
decision may be marred by inconsistencies and defects that may
create more safety hazards than it cures when applied at the petitioner's mine.
Although settling a petition case can be difficult, two mechanisms
for settling petition cases have been successfully employed. One works
within the strict framework of the regulations; 19' the other, arguably,
does not.
1.

Consent Findings

The regulations permit an AL to issue consent findings and an
order disposing of all or part of a petition case. 92 There is, however,
no corresponding regulation governing settlement when either the

191. 30 C.F.R. § 44.27 (1988).
192. 30 C.F.R. § 44.27 (1988).
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Administrator'93 or the Assistant Secretary has jurisdiction over a
petition case. Section 44.27194 governs consent findings:
(a) General. At any time before reception of evidence in any hearing or during
any hearing, a reasonable opportunity may be afforded to permit negotiation by
the parties of an agreement containing consent findings and a rule or order disposing of the whole or any part of the proceedings. Allowance of such opportunity
and the duration thereof shall be in the discretion of the Chief Administrative
Law Judge, if no administrative law judge has been assigned, or of the presiding
administrative law judge. In deciding whether to afford such an opportunity, the
administrative law judge shall consider the nature of the proceeding, requirements
of the public interest, representations of the parties, and probability of an agreement which will result in a just disposition of the issues involved.
(d) Disposition. In the event an agreement containing consent findings and rule
or order is submitted within the time allowed, the Chief Administrative Law Judge
or presiding administrative law judge, as appropriate, may accept the agreement
by issuing his decision based upon the agreed findings. 9

The language of section 44.27(a) has created a question as to
whether an ALJ must make a finding that a settlement is in the
"public interest" before granting the petition. It has been argued,
based on that language, that the "public interest" finding relates
only to the opportunity for negotiation, but not to the approval of
a settlement. 96 One ALJ has rejected that view.
In Castle Gate Coal Co., 97 the ALJ examined the "public interest" language of 30 C.F.R. section 44.27(a) in the context of
section 44.27(d) and the purpose of the Act. 9 8 She concluded that
evaluating the public interest of affording an opportunity to negotiate a settlement, among other factors, 99 made no sense if the
193. Any settlement that could conceivably be reached while the petition was pending before
the Administrator would arguably be inconsistent with § 101(c) of the Act. First, it would shortcut
the statutorily mandated investigation. Second, it may not afford an opportunity for all partiesMSHA, the mine operators, and the miners-to be involved. See 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1982).
194. 30 C.F.R. § 44.27 (1988).
195. Id.
196. See Decision and Order Granting Petition for Modification and Staying Proceeding Pursuant
to Consent Findings and Order at 2, Castle Gate Coal Co., No. 88-MSA-2 (June 8, 1988) (ALJ
Rosenzweig).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2-5.
199. The regulations require that four factors be considered in affording the opportunity to
"permit negotiation by the parties of an agreement containing consent findings and a rule or order. . .:" 1) nature of the proceedings, 2) the public interest, 3) representations of the parties, and
4) the probability that the agreement will result in a just disposition of the issues. 30 C.F.R. § 44.27(a)
(1988).
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terms of the agreement were not also considered in light of the public

interest.2 00° She held that a "public interest" finding is a condition
precedent to approval of an agreement containing consent findings:
I conclude that finding the mandatory list of considerations a condition precedent
to allowing the opportunity for negotiations and settlement, is consistent with the
discretion afforded the administrative law judge to allow-or not-such opportunity. Thus, why make the process discretionary if there is no reason to exercise
that discretion? Put another way, the four mandatory considerations provide a
framework for the exercise of that discretion. Thus, a settlement pursuant to the
Act is not an agreement among private parties. It is, rather-or should be-a
legal act consistent with the public will as expressed by Congress; and the discretion exercised by the administrative law judge in approving-or not-that settlement must be guided accordingly. These four mandatory considerations provide
that guidance.2'

In deciding what form the "public interest" finding should
take in the petition for modification context, the ALJ relied on the
framework set forth in a case where a federal district court approved
a settlement between the federal government, a private party, and
intervenor state and local governments for hazardous waste cleanup. 212
In Castle Gate,203 the ALJ only approved a settlement after considering whether the settlement was 1) consistent with section 44.27214
25
and the Act, 2) fair and adequate, and 3) reasonable.
In another case, the ALJ modified the parties' proffered consent
agreement to exclude a provision which would have required the
Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges to oversee future implementation of the alternative methods proposed in
200. Decision and Order Granting Petition for Modification and Staying Proceeding Pursuant
to Consent Findings and Order at 3-4, Castle Gate, No. 88-MSA-2.
201. Id. at 4-5. See also Pyro Mining, No. 86-MSA-5. In that case, without the same degree
of analysis used in Castle Gate, the same ALI rejected a consent agreement and a revised consent
agreement submitted for her approval, concluding, "Thus, the regulations [30 C.F.R. § 44.27(a)]
appear to recognize that the public interest may, in appropriate circumstances, override a consent
agreement in which all parties to a modification proceeding have concurred." Pyro Mining, No. 86MSA-5, slip op. at 3 n.3.
202. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (quoted
in Decision and Order Granting Petition for Modification and Staying Proceeding Pursuant to Consent
Finding and Order at 8, Castle Gate, No. 88-MSA-2).
203. Castle Gate, No. 88-MSA-2.
204. 30 C.F.R. § 44.27 (1988).
205. Decision Order Granting Petition for Modification and Staying Proceeding Pursuant to
Consent Finding and Order at 8-9, Castle Gate, No. 88-MSA-2.
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a petition. 20 6 The case involved a petition for modification of 30
C.F.R. section 75.1710,207 which requires electric equipment used in
face areas of a mine to be equipped with cabs or canopies. The
consent agreement to grant the petition with conditions contained
a clause requiring the mine operator to purchase state-of-the-art
equipment that would be compatible with mining heights at the affected mine. The ALJ disallowed that provision because it would
have required an ALJ to administer it by resolving future disputes
as to whether equipment purchased by the operator was state of the
art or was compatible with mining heights at its mine. 208
The foregoing examples demonstrate the variety of problems
which may be encountered in attempting to settle a petition case via
the consent finding route. First, the ALJ may not approve a consent
agreement. Second, the ALJ may not feel sufficiently competent in
the subject at issue to evaluate and approve a settlement responsibly,
especially if the agreement containing consent findings and an order
is submitted before the hearing. Third, the ALJ may not approve
an agreement on the terms reached by the parties. Fourth, settlement
is only available as an option when a proceeding is pending before
an ALJ-not the Administrator- or Assistant Secretary. 210
2.

Withdrawal of the Request for Hearing

Under limited circumstances, a second, more streamlined approach to settlement may apply in a petition case. Although the
Part 44 rules provide no specific mechanism for such a procedure,
parties have sought to give effect to settlement agreements by having
the party opposing the Administrator's grant of a petition withdraw
11
its request for hearing.

206. Clinchfield Coal Co., No. 83-MSA-9 (May 24, 1985) (ALJ Rippey).
207. 30 C.F.R. § 75.1710 (1988).
208. Clinchfield Coal, No. 83-MSA-9, slip op. at 2.
209. See supra note 191.
210. In the preamble to the proposed revisions to Part 44, which were released following the
completion of this article, the Secretary noted that MSHA is considering amending the exting § 44.27
to permit settlement at any time after a hearing has been requested and even after a hearing has been
held. 54 Fed. Reg. 19494 (1989).
211. See Order, Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17; Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 2.
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Part 44 does not address the situation where a party who filed
a request for hearing to oppose the Administrator's grant of a petition later seeks to withdraw the request for hearing.212 Presumably,
if the request for hearing were withdrawn, the Administrator's proposed decision and order granting the petition would become effective immediately, assuming thirty days had elapsed after issuance
213
of the Administrator's decision.
This procedure has very limited application. It can only be used
where the parties agree, as part of a settlement, that the Administrator's proposed decision and order can take effect as is, without
any changes. In one such case involving a petition for modification
of section 75.305,214 the parties settled the case by reaching a twopart agreement. The first part consisted of an agreement between
the miners and the company; as consideration for that agreement,
the miners agreed, with MSHA's consent, to withdraw their request
for hearing. The ALJ granted the UMWA's motion for withdrawal
of the request for hearing and remanded the case to the Administrator for implementation of the proposed decision and order as
of the date it would have become final had no request for hearing
21 5
been filed.
The availability of this simplified approach is not assured, however. In another petition case, the ALJ refused to remand a petition
to the Administrator for reconsideration because the Part 44 rules
21 6
did not provide for such a remand.
These two cases can be reconciled despite seemingly different
conclusions about the authority of an ALJ to remand a petition case
from an ALJ to the Administrator. In Island Creek,217 the case was
"remanded" to the Administrator solely to implement the granted
petition. Because of the MSHA enforcement scheme under the Act,

212. 30 C.F.R. pt. 44 (1988); see also Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 2.
213. See Order, Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17. Indeed, in Island Creek, the ALI deemed such
petition to have taken effect 30 days after the Administrator's decision, as if no request for hearing
had ever been filed. Id.
214. Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17.
215. See Order, Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17.
216. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016, slip op. at 2.
217. Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17.
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every petition granted at any stage ultimately becomes the Administrtor's enforcement responsibility. Thus, the "remand" in Island

Creek2 8 was really not a remand at all because it required no additional findings or reconsideration on the part of the Administrator
but only implementation of a decision already made. On the other

hand, the remand requested in Quarto2 9 did require substantive re220
consideration of the petition. Unlike the situation in Island Creek,

the remand sought in Quarto221 was inconsistent with the petition
process because it sought two decisions on the merits from the same
decisionmaker; the petition scheme, however, contemplates only one

decision on the merits from each decisionmaker-the Administrator,
ALJ and Assistant Secretary. 222 The "remand" in Island Creek22-

218. Id.
219. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016.
220. Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17.
221. Quarto, No. 83-MSA-0016.
222. Despite Part 44's lack of provision for remanding a petition case to the Administrator,
several ALJ's have remanded cases to the Administrator. None of these remands seem consistent with
procedural scheme of Part 44. 30 C.F.R. pt. 44 at 247 (1987).
First, cases, have been remanded to the Administrator for reconsideration of the petition 1) in
light of a new alternative method proposed by the petitioner; 2) because the Administrator agreed
to change certain conditions in a proposed decision and order to which the petitioner objected; and
3) in light of pending revision to the mandatory standard sought to be modified. See Order of Remand,
Dominion Coal Corp., No. 87-MSA-12 (Dec. 8, 1987) (ALJ Vittone); Order of Remand, Peabody
Coal Co., No. 87-MSA-4 (Nov. 24, 1987) (ALJ Vittone); Order of Remand, Consolidation Coal Co.,
No. 87-MSA-6 (Nov. 24, 1987) (ALJ Vittone); Order of Remand, Homestake Mining Co., No. 82MSA,13 (Jun. 1, 1983) (ALJ Matera); Order of Remand, Helevtia Coal Co.,No. 82-MSA-18, et al.
(Feb. 8, 1983) (ALI Murty). Part 44 does not contemplate such remands for reconsideration; it
provides for one decision on the merits at each stage of the petition process.
Second, cases have been remanded to the Administrator because idlement of the affected mine
has made it impossible to conduct a hearing of the case. See Order of Remand, Price River Coal
Co., No. 84-MSA-5 (Aug. 7, 1985) (ALJ Matera); Order of Remand, A&E Coal Co., No. 82-MSA7 (Jun. 30, 1983) (ALJ Williams); Order of Remand, Everidge & Nease Coal Co., No. 81-MSA-7
(Jun. 30, 1983), vacated (Aug. 19, 1983) (ALJ Williams) (mine no longer idle). From a procedural
point of view, it makes no sense for a case to be remanded to the Administrator for anything other
than implementation of a proposed decision and order. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying
text. Nor do the rules provide for such a remand. If a case cannot be set for hearing due to idlement
or changed circumstances, the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Law Judges over the case
is not affected, such that remand to the Administrator is required. Rather, the proper procedure
would seem to be for the presiding ALJ to stay the proceeding until such time as a hearing could
be set, or in the proper case, to dismiss the proceeding as moot. See Decision and Order Granting
Petition for Modification and Staying Proceeding Pursuant to Consent Finding and Order at 10,
Castle Gate, No. 88-MSA-2.
One way for the Administrator to "reconsider" the petition while skirting this "remand" issue
would be for the petitioner to withdraw its petition and file it anew. Nothing in the rules or the
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falls within the framework of the petition process because the request
for hearing was withdrawn before the second-stage decisionmakerthe AU -could issue an initial decision; the withdrawal merely
revived a decision already reached.
Given the protracted litigation over petitions for modification,
settlement agreements provide a significant benefit. Granted petitions become effective immediately without the time delays involved
in the hearing, briefing, and appeals processes.
B.

Rulemaking

Although settlement may offer a case-by-case solution, problems
in the petition process are systemic and could be substantially resolved through comprehensive rulemaking. Some of the defects in
the present process are caused by the Secretary's regulations: for
example, the lack of decision-forcing time limits for various stages
of the process, the effect of mere filing of an appeal or request for
hearing in staying agency action, and a requirement that an application for relief pending appeal must be filed long before the appeal
is filed. Other problems have resulted from post-promulgation decisions. Both types of problems could be rectified by rulemaking.
Already steps are being taken in that direction. The Department
of Labor advises that it will soon release proposed revisions to the
Part 44 rules.2 These proposed rules are expected to address interim
relief in light of Int'7 Union/(Kaiser),2 1 as well as the concerns raised

statute limits the number of times that a petition for modification (which has never been finally
decided) can be filed. Refing would mean, however, that MSHA would have to investigate it again,
since every petition must be investigated. 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (1986); 30 C.F.R. § 44.13 (1988).
223. Island Creek, No. 88-MSA-17.
224. Since this article was written, the Secretary has published proposed revisions to Part 44.
54 Fed. Reg. 19,492 (1989).
225. Int'l Union/(Kaiser), 823 F.2d 608. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. The proposed rules address the issue of interim relief by effectively eliminating it. 54 Fed. Reg. 19492-93
(1989). The mild palliative offered by the Secretary under the proposed rules would permit a party
whose petition has been granted by the Administrator to request that the Administor's proposed
decision and order be given effect during the thirty day period in which parties can request a hearing
under § 44.14. This truncated form of relief would constitute no relief at all in contested petition
cases, because one showing necessary to have such relief granted is that no party disagrees with the
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in a petition for rulemaking filed by one trade association. That

petition for rulemaking focuses upon expedition of the petition process in appropriate cases. 2 26 Under the trade association proposal, if
a petitioner applied for expedited treatment of its petition and that
motion were granted, strict time limits would be imposed at each
stage in the petition process so that a final agency decision (including

an appeal to the Assistant Secretary) 227 would be issued within 115
days after filing the petition.21 The proposal would also provide for
appeal of any decision denying expedited consideration of a petition.
The trade association proposal clearly was intended to mitigate
the adverse effect of the void left by the D.C. Circuit's invalidation
of the interim relief regulations. Much more needs to be done to
improve the petition process, however. For example, the trade association proposal does not set forth any criteria for granting expedited consideration of a petition. If expedited consideration could
be granted only upon a diminution of safety showing, as the pro-

Administrator's proposed decision and order.
Under the proposed rules, relief pending appeal would be eliminated as a remedy. The Secretary
believes that the proposed expedited timetable for deciding petitions would make relief pending appeal
a superfluous remedy. She stated:
Since an application for relief pending appeal amounts to little more than a motion to
expedite a decision on the petition for modification, the Agency believes that the relief
pending appeal rule would serve no additional purpose and therefore should be deleted.
54 Fed. Reg. 19,495 (1989).
Despite the proposed elimination of interim relief under the rules, the preamble to the proposed
rules gives continued vitality to the emergency relief concept. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text. It states, "MSHA continues to interpret the Court of Appeals decision [in Int'l Union!
(Kaiser)] to permit carefully tailored, short-term remedies in cases where application of the standard
at a mine endangers miners." 54 Fed. Reg. 19,493 (1989).
226. National Coal Association ("NCA"), Petition for Rulemaking (June 14, 1988).
227. The proposed rules would require that appeals on petitions for modification be taken directly
to the Secretary, rather than the Assistant Secretary. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,494 (1989). The Agency justified
this proposed revision by explaining that it would permit the Secretary to rely on the expertise of
MSHA's technical and legal staff-an option not available to the Assistant Secretary. 54 Fed. Reg.
19,494 (1989). While it is not clear that this transfer would solve the problem in extreme decisionmaking
delays at the appeal state, unlike the existing rules, there is provision for expedited proceedings on
appeal. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,496 (1989).
228. In the preamble to the proposed Part 44 revisions, the Secretary states:
The proposal goes beyond the NCA petition and incorporates a time schedule for all states
of decisionmaking on petitions. Also, at various stages in the petition process, the proposal
would permit interested parties to submit requests to expedite or extend the time schedule,
which may be granted in the discretion of the decisionmakers.
54 Fed. Reg. 19,492 (1989).
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posal implies, 229 it would be of limited value, leaving petitioners who
allege the safety of an alternative method to wait out the normal,
protracted petition process. However, if either diminution of safety
or the safety of an alternative method could support expedited consideration, then special, but as yet unidentified criteria may have to
be satisfied in addition to the statutory standards to warrant expedited consideration. Since the existing preliminary relief regulations now in limbo (interim relief and relief pending appeal) provided
for expedited consideration upon a showing of exigent circumstances, any expedited proceedings provision in the upcoming rules
may be similarly conditioned230°
Regardless of the form in which they appear, the proposed revisions to Part 44 represent an important opportunity for the mining
community to cure many of the defects in the present process. All
parties interested in mine safety must carefully study the system and
propose the kinds of changes needed to revitalize the petition process
so that it can serve the critical safety function which Congress intended.
C. Legislation
By far the most promising method
the current petition process, albeit the
would be legislation to amend section
jurisdiction over petition cases to the

for curing the deficiencies in
most difficult to accomplish,
101(c) of the Act to transfer
Commission. 231

The petition process which would follow from such a legislative
change would be virtually identical to the current one in form, except
that Commission ALJs, instead of Department of Labor ALJs, would
hear petition cases and issue an initial decision, and the Commission,
instead of the Assistant Secretary, would decide appeals from the
229. The NCA petition states, "Such a procedure [for expedited proceedings, as proposed,]
should address situations where the routine one to three year delay prevents the continuation or
initiation of safe and effective mining."
230. Under the proposed rules, the matter of expediting proceedings upon request of a party is
purely discretionary with the decisionmaker. No standards for the granting of expedited consideration
are provided. 54 Fed. Reg. 19,492, 19,495-96 (1989).
231. See supra note 7 and notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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initial decision and issue a final decision. Judicial review would be
in the federal courts of appeal, as with all other Commission decisions .232
Transferring jurisdiction over petition hearings to the Commission need not change the current procedure under which the Administrator investigates a petition and issues a recommended decision
which becomes final unless a request for hearing is filed, much as
MSHA's civil penalty assessments become final Commission orders
unless contested. 233 Under the suggested change, a request for hearing following the Administrator's decision would be referred to the
Commission for assignment to a Commission ALJ, instead of to
the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges.
Transferring jurisdiction from the Department of Labor ALJs
and the Assistant Secretary to the Commission and its ALJs offers
numerous advantages. First, that action would place jurisdiction over
all disputed mine safety cases in the hands of the Commission, which
has expertise in mine safety. Second, the right to have a petition
decided before the abatement time on a citation expires 234 would
take on renewed vitality because the Commission ALJ would be able
to decide the petition in the context of an enforcement proceeding.235
Third, any questions about whether a particular standard even applied to a mine could also be decided in the course of a consolidated
case before one Commission ALJ. The ALJ would be better positioned to do justice and promote mine safety because, in a combined petition and enforcement proceeding, it would be possible to
determine, for example, whether a particular standard ought to be
invalidated or merely modified with respect to the peculiar conditions of the mine in question. Fourth, by strict adherence to the
requirements and spirit of Commission Rule 52,236 the Commission
232. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1), (b) (1982).
233. 30 U.S.C. §§ 815(a) (1982).
234. Gateway, I I.B.M.A. 82; Reliable, 1 I.B.M.A. 97.
235. In Reliable, 1 I.B.M.A. 97, a mining company's petition and its challenge to enforcement
action taken under the standard sought to be modified were tried in the same proceeding before a
Board hearing examiner and ultimately decided on appeal by the Board. See supra note 112.
236. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.52 (1988).
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and its ALJs have demonstrated that they can act surely and swiftly. 2 7
Indeed, a side benefit to such a legislative solution would be that
the Part 44 rules could be eliminated. They could be replaced altogether, with a few modifications, by the Commission's existing
rules.
In the interest of fairness to all and the safety of miners, it is
time to cure the statutory anomaly in section 101(c) of the Act,
which left jurisdiction over petition cases with the Secretary although
all other mine safety cases were transferred to the Commission.
V.

CoNcLsoN

Conceived by Congress as vehicle for providing the flexibility to
maximize safety in the context of changing mining conditions and
technology, the petition for modification process, in practice, has
been sapped of its vitality. One ALJ has said of a petition case
before her, "[i]t may well be that the difficulties presented by this
case exist merely because society asks that its judges render perfect
decisions for an imperfect world." '38 There can be no doubt that
the present petition process manifests that imperfection.
Faced with unconscionable delays in obtaining approval of a petition for modification where a hearing is requested by another party,
and without practical recourse in the form of preliminary relief,
petitioners have had to agree to settlements in their cases to get any
relief at all this side of the millennium. Proposed changes in regulations are anticipated to provide some help in streamlining the
process. Moreover, some of the issues discussed in this article have
now, for the most part, been well ventilated in proceedings before
ALJs and are on appeal to the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant
Secretary's long awaited decisions may remove some of the uncertainties from the petition process, as may the eventual decisions of
the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the only sure cure is statutory
reform transferring to the Commission the responsibility for deciding
contested petitions for modification. There may be no perfect de-

237. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
238. Kaiser Coal, No. 86-MSA-l, slip op. at 217.
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cisions in an imperfect world, but at least the odds are better when
the decisionmaker has expertise in the matters to be decided.
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